Portrait of Prof. Dr. Christian Wey

Prof. Dr. Christian Wey

Academic Affiliate

Prof. Dr. Christian Wey holds the Chair of Competition and Regulatory Economics at the Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) and is Academic Affiliate Düsseldorf Competition Economics. He has extensive project experience. Christian has led numerous consulting projects, including negotiations and market power in food retailing (e.g. Handelsverband Deutschland - HDE, Tengelmann Warenhandelsgesellschaft), on regulatory issues in telecommunications (e.g. Deutsche Telekom and the Federal Ministry of Economics) and in the health sector (e.g. Verband der Forschungsden Arzneimittelhersteller, humediQ). In addition, he is an impartial member of the arbitration board ("Schiedsstelle") of the Spitzenverband Bund der Krankenkassen (GKV) for digital health applications according to § 134 Abs. 3 Satz 1 SGB V.

Before joining DICE, Christian was Professor of Networks and ICT Economics at the Technical University of Berlin and head of the Information Society and Competition Department at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW). His research focuses on competition policy with a focus on merger control and the regulation of vertical business relationships, in particular the analysis of bargaining power in supplier-customer relationships and buyer power.

+49 (0) 211 811 5055

Habilitation, Humboldt University Berlin

Doctorate, Saarland University, Saarbrücken

MA (Economics), Indiana University, USA

MBA (Diplom-Kaufmann), Saarland University, Saarbrücken

Dertwinkel-Kalt, M. and C. Wey (2023), Why "Energy Price Brakes" Encourage Moral Hazard, Raise Energy Prices, and Reinforce Energy Savings, RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming.

Döpper, H., G. Sapi und C. Wey [2023], A Bargaining Perspective on Vertical Integration, Canadian Journal of Economics, DOI: 10.1111/caje.12700

Dertwinkel-Kalt, M. and C. Wey (2023), Resale Price Maintenance in a Successive Monopoly Model, Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming.

Dertwinkel-Kalt, M. und C. Wey C. [2023], Third-degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly When Markets are Covered, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 71 (2), pp. 464-490.

Christian Wey, B. Schröder and D. Fritz, Creating the Single Market: The AB InBev Case in Perspective, November 2022, Concurrences No 4-2022, Art. N° 108966, pp. 36-42 .

Jovanovic, D., C. Wey and M. Zhang (2021), On the Social Welfare Effects of Runner-up Mergers in Concentrated Markets, Economics Bulletin, Article A201.

Dertwinkel-Kalt, M. and C. Wey (2021), Evidence Production in Merger Control: The Role of Remedies, Review of Industrial Organization, Vol. 59, pp. 1-12.

Haucap, J., U. Heimeshoff, G. Klein, D. Rickert and C. Wey (2021), Vertical Relations, Pass-through, and Market Definition: Evidence from Grocery Retailing, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 74, 102693.

Dertwinkel-Kalt, M. and C. Wey (2020), Multi-Product Bargaining, Bundling, and Buyer Power, Economics Letters, Vol. 188, 108936.

Baye, I., V. Von Schlippenbach and C. Wey (2018), One-Stop Shopping Behavior, Buyer Power, and Upstream Merger Incentives, Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 66, pp. 66-94.

Dertwinkel-Kalt, M., J. Haucap and C. Wey (2016), Procompetitive Dual Pricing, European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 41(3), pp. 537-557.

Aghadadashl, H., M. Dertwinkel-Kalt and C. Wey (2016), C., The Nash Bargaining Solution in Vertical Relations With Linear Input Prices, Economics Letters, Vol. 145, Spp 291-294.

Baye, I., B. Pagel and C. Wey (2016), How to Counter Union Power? Equilibrium Mergers in International Oligopoly, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 127, pp. 16-29.

Dertwinkel-Kalt, M. and C. Wey (2016), Structural Remedies as a Signalling Device, Information Economics and Policy, Vol. 35, pp. 1-6.

Dertwinkel-Kalt, M., Haucap, J. and C. Wey (2016), C., Raising Rivals’ Cost Through Buyer Power, Economic Letters, Vol. 126, pp. 181-184.

Jovanovic, D. and C. Wey (2014), Passive Partial Ownership, Sneaky Takeovers, and Merger Control, Economic Letters, Vol. 125, pp. 32-35.